The OpEd piece in the New York Times Sunday, "
The War as We Saw It" is one of those articles that will garner a lot of attention. After all, it was written by seven Sergeants [actually six and one Specialist - NOTR]! You know these are the soldiers that have no political aspirations, nothing to lose if they 'lay it out as they see it' - so it must be true! But I admit, the erudition of the article article makes me a bit suspicious how much of this was from the 'seven' and how much was from the editors of the paper.
One simple fact must be recognized anytime you talk to an Iraq War Veteran about 'the war.' His view is situational. It is colored by when he was there, where he was, and what he did during his tour. Talk to a FOBBit, an Apache driver, a member of 5/7 Cav, 3rd ACR, or a member of the 82nd Airborne Division and you will get very different views of 'the war.' Some units do COIN well, others don't. Some work AO's that are generally homogeneous, others work areas were 'neigborhoods' are waging war on the other. It is bad logic to extrapolate the experiences of selected soldiers to generalize about the war in Iraq. But that has never stopped the NY Times before, has it?
About the only thing that is common when you talk to soldiers is their view of the ineffectual central Iraqi government, the frustration of dealing with so many players on the battlefield - each with contradictory motivations, and the fact that most Iraqis have reached a point that they know they can only trust their clan or tribe to provide the security they all so desperately seek.
Only when you view Iraq from a macrocosmic level do you see seastate changes in the battlespace in Al Anbar and Diyalah provinces. Even Mosul and certain neighborhoods in Baghdad have returned to some degree of normalcy - which doesn't mean no IEDs or VBIEDs - it simply means anarchy does not reign. Meanwhile in Basra, the hard work of the Iranians is starting to bear fruit as the British forces withdraw their forces and are being replaced by hardline Shiitte militias. It reflects the successes and setbacks that our soldiers deal with every day.
Every American soldier recognizes that there is a wide disparity between the motivation and loyalty of such government elements as the Iraqi border guards, Iraqi Army, and Iraqi police. Each is made up of individuals whose loyalty is to their clan or tribe long before a central government. Their motivation is not to support the aims of the US forces, or their central government but to support the only source of security they know, their clan. I have had more than one returning soldier tell me that the Iraqs 'don't give a damn' about what they did for them. Thats only partly true. In a society where there is no 'individual', only family, clan and tribal loyalty they care a lot so long as the Americans are doing what they perceive is in their group's interest. But even that characterization may be too simple.
For instance, John Q. Iraqi just wants to get by and maybe get a bit ahead. He'd like to have a future and would like to see his family and tribe get ahead in that future. In comes Abu Jihad and his band of psychos who tells John Q that they will be living with him for several days. They set up a mortar and plan on shooting at the local US base from his front yard. John Q has a choice to make and it won't be his alone anyhow, but one made after consultation with his tribal elder. His actions are driven by what the elder believes are in the best interest of the clan.
John Q can tell the Americans about Abu Jihad or say nothing and let Abu do his thing. If he let's Abu shoot at the Americans, he knows they will be pissed and will raid his house. He might be taken away for questioning. But if he tells the Americans and gets caught doing it, or if Abu Jihad even thinks John Q told the Americans, Abu will kill him. Or kill his family. Or take his son away, torture him, and mail him back in pieces to his family. Abu Jihad justifies all his horrendous acts as authorized by his God, which means he can do pretty much anything, no matter how horrible. In contrast, the Americans will ... act reasonably and with restraint. So, Abu gets his Jihad on and we think John Q is on his side. Yet, in reality John Q Iraqi has few options. His only "choice" is to die or get his family killed or live, nothing more.
But the "Seven Sergeants" make the excellent point that the US hamstrings itself when considering 'appropriate' responses to Abu Jihad and his band of "merry men." Abu Jihad is free to employ any and all techniques to achieve his objectives. We are severely curtailed by our own self imposed limitations and the fear that we might be viewed as too 'warlike' by the leftys in America and Europe. We underestimate the value that a hyperkinetic US response represents within a culture that understands brute force more clearly than it does an occupier who hands out rations and beanie babies. That restraint plays well with liberal US factions and Western Europe, but is misconstrued by our enemies. No one in the Middle East or Iraq sees US restraint as anything but a weakness, a lack of commitment, or as Osama bin Laden described, a lack of moral courage.
The US worries whether people like them, at least in altruistic circles. Long ago we passed the point where we might be viewed as benevolent occupiers in Iraq. Of course, we worry that violent responses might be viewed around the world as no better than existed under Saddam Hussein. Yet we should never forget that many Iraqis pine for those days, where at least they knew who the enemy was, and they could feel safe otherwise. There may be times that a B-52 arc-light is the appropriate response to a threat. You never have to win the hearts and minds of those who experience one. You simply bury them. Its a reality of war, we need to not lose sight of.
If there is one message from the 'seven' it is simply that we have reached that point in Iraq that it is time to let the Iraqis sort it out. "Winning" by driving Al-Qaeda out of places it now wields control will help the clans and tribes meet their goals, but do little to help the US goal of establishing a strong central government in Baghdad. The 'seven' believe that we may not like the outcome, but it is time to take American lives and treasure out of the mix. It is a message that more and more soldiers are beginning to deliver, but only 'off the record.'
